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Abstract
We show that the existence of a computationally efficient calibration algorithm,
with a low weak calibration rate, would imply the existence of an efficient algo-
rithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria — thus implying the unlikely
conclusion that every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Consider a weather forecaster that predicts the probability of rain. The forecaster is said
to be calibrated if every time she predicts a certain probability of rain, the empirical
average of rainy vs. non-rainy days approaches this forecasted probability.
This very natural property of forecasting was introduced by [Daw82] and has found
numerous applications since [FV97, FV98, KLS99, Fos99, FL99, MSA07, Per09, MS10,
RST11]. See [CL06] for a more detailed bibliographic survey.
[FV98] provided the first randomized calibration algorithms. Subsequently, numer-
ous other algorithms have been developed based on various different techniques have
followed: Blackwell approachability [Fos99], internal-regret minimization [FV98] and
online convex optimization [ABH11], to name a few.
While existence results for calibration are well established, our understanding of
the statistical and computational complexity is more murky. The statistical complex-
ity can be thought of as the number of rounds it takes achieve some natural notion
of a low calibration; the computational complexity can be thought of as the net com-
putation time to achieve this. This work provides a lower bound for the latter. When
characterizing the efficiency of algorithms, the critical issue is the relationship between
the relevant parameters and the desired notion of calibration. The notion of the (total)
calibration rate (at precision ε) is essentially that defined by [FV98]. The relevant pa-
rameters are the number of forecasting iterations (henceforth denoted T ), the precision
of calibration ε, and number of possible outcomes in the forecasting game, d. A variant
of this question was posed as an open problem in [AM11]. 1
1[AM11] did not explicitly pose this question in terms of net computation time.
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In this work, we give a negative result showing that calibration (in the worst case)
is hard, under a widely-believed computational complexity assumption. In particular,
we utilize a natural (smooth) notion of calibration at scale ε, namely weak calibration
(as in [KF08]). Precisely, the complexity implication of our main result, Theorem 3, is
as follows:
Corollary 1. Suppose there exists a constant c > 0 and a weak calibration algorithm
which, for every precision ε > 0, attains a calibration rate of εc in a total compu-
tational running time (in the RAM model) that is polynomial in both d and 1ε , then
PPAD ⊆ RP .
Here, the weak calibration rate is a cumulative notion of error, precisely defined
in in Section 2; RP stands for the complexity class of randomized polynomial time;
PPAD is the class of problems that are polynomial time reducible to the problem of
computing Nash equilibrium in a two player game (See [Pap94, Das09]). It is widely
believed that PPAD is not contained in RP . Note that we are considering the total
computation time over all T rounds (so there is no explicit T dependence).
2 Calibration
Calibration inherently concerns distributions, and when comparing distributions it makes
sense to talk about statistical distance or its closely related cousin the ℓ1 norm, rather
than the Euclidean norm. Therefore throughout we use ‖ · ‖ to denote the ℓ1 norm and
‖ · ‖p to denote the ℓp norm.
We let {0, 1, 2, ..., d} be an outcome space, and X1, X2, . . .XT be a sequence of
outcomes, denoted as Xt ∈ {0, 1}d, such that Xt(i) is one if and only if the outcome
in iteration t is i ∈ [d]. Hence 1T
∑
tXt is the empirical frequency of outcomes.
A randomized forecasterA produces a sequence of probability distributionsD1, ...,DT
over the set ∆d = {p ∈ Rd, pi ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1}. Every iteration a point in the interior
of the simplex is chosen: pt ∼ Dt, which constitutes the forecast ofA.
Strong Calibration: For a set of points V ⊂ ∆d, define the following “test” functions
(where the argmin breaks ties arbitrarily):
Ip(q) =


1 p = argminp′∈V ‖p
′ − q‖
0 otherwise
We say this set of test function is at precision ε if V is such that every q ∈ ∆d is at least
ε-close (in ℓ1) to some point in V , i.e. for all q ∈ ∆d, we have minp∈V ‖p − q‖ ≤ ε
(i.e. the set V is an ε-cover for ∆d).
Definition 1. Let the strong-calibration rate of a (possibly randomized) forecaster A,
with respect to indicator test functions Fε = {Iq(·)} at precision ε, be
CT (X1:T ,A,F
ε) = E
D1,...,DT

 1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Ip(pt)(pt −Xt)
∥∥∥∥∥


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This definition is closely related to that used in [BL85, FV98]; the latter definition
is motivated by a bias-variance decomposition of the Brier score. The distinctions being
that [FV98] use the squared ℓ2 error (while we use the ℓ1 primarily for convenience)
and [FV98] restrict A to make predictions which lie in V (a minor distinction).
Much of the literature is concerned with the asymptotic behavior, without explicitly
characterizing the finite time rate. It is standard to say that a forecaster A is (strongly)
asymptotically calibrated if for all X1:T , we can drive CT (A,Fε) to 0, as T → ∞.
If A is restricted to make predictions in the set V , then this notion seeks to drive
CT (A,Fε) ≤ ε in the limit. In this work, the rate of this function is critical.
The definition of asymptotic calibration considers the “total error” over an ε-grid,
and it adjusts the normalization for each term to 1T . Note that our indicator functions
satisfy for all q ∈ ∆d: ∑
p∈V
Ip(q) = 1 (1)
Since every q is covered by only one indicator function. This implies that:
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
Ip(pt) = 1
which implies that CT (X1:T ,A,Fε) is bounded by 2.
Weak Calibration: We now turn to the notion of weak calibration, which covers ∆d
in a more continuous manner. The weak calibration rate is more naturally defined by
a triangulation of the simplex, ∆d. By this, we mean that ∆d is partitioned into a set
of simplices such that any two simplices intersect in either a common face, common
vertex, or not at all. Let V be the vertex set of this triangulation. Note that any point q
lies in some simplex in this triangulation, and, slightly abusing notation, let V (q) be the
set of corners for this simplex. Note that the function V (·) specifies the triangulation.
Instead of indicator functions Ip(·), we associate a test function ωp(·) with each
p ∈ V as follows. Each q ∈ ∆d can be uniquely written as a weighted average of its
neighboring vertices, V (q). For p ∈ V (q), let us define the test functions ωp(q) to be
these linear weights, so they are uniquely defined by the linear equation:
q =
∑
p∈V (q)
ωp(q)p
For p /∈ V (q), we let ωp(q) = 0. We refer to this set of functions as the triangulated
test functions with regards to V (·) and say that this is at precision ε if the diameter of
the set of points V (q) is less than ε for all q.
A useful property is that for all q ∈ ∆d,∑
p∈V
ωp(q) = 1 (2)
since q lies in the convex hull of V (q). In comparison to Equation (1), these test
functions cover ∆d in a more smooth manner: they again sum to 1, and each ωp(q) is
a continuous function (as opposed to the discontinuous indicator functions).
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We now define deterministic calibration algorithms, so called “weak calibration”
with regards to these Lipchitz test functions.
Definition 2. Let Wε = {ωp} be a set of triangulated test functions at precision ε.
The weak-calibration rate for a (deterministic) forecaster A with respect to to Wε
CT (X1:T ,A,W
ε) =
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
ωp(pt)(pt −Xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
[KF08] showed that there exist deterministic calibration algorithms (also see [MSA07]).
Again, note the normalization property:
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
ωp(pt) = 1
which implies that CT (X1:T ,A,Wε) is bounded by 2.
3 Main Result
Our main result is based on using a calibration algorithm to compute a Nash equilib-
rium of a two player game. Before we state our main result, let us review the definition
of an approximate Nash equilibrium, along with the attendant computational complex-
ity results.
3.1 Nash equilibria in games
A (square) two-player bi-matrix game is defined by two payoff matrices U1, U2 ∈
R
n×n
, such that if the row and column players choose pure strategies i, j ∈ [n], respec-
tively, the payoff to the row and column players are U1(i, j) and U2(i, j), respectively.
A mixed strategy for a player is a distribution over pure strategies (i.e. rows/columns),
and for brevity we may refer to it simply as a strategy. An ε-approximate Nash equi-
librium is a pair of mixed strategies (p, q) such that
∀i ∈ [n], p⊤U1q ≥ e
⊤
i U1q − ε,
∀j ∈ [n], p⊤U2q ≥ p
⊤U2ej − ε.
Here and throughout, ei is the i-th standard basis vector, i.e. 1 in i-th coordinate, and 0
in all other coordinates. If ε = 0, the strategy pair is called a Nash equilibrium (NE).
For notational convenience, we slightly abuse notation by denoting the payoffs of
mixed strategies as:
U1(p, q) = p
⊤U1q , U2(p, q) = p
⊤U2q
The definition immediately implies that the pair (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium if and
only if for all mixed strategies x˜, y˜,
U1(x, y) ≥ U1(x˜, y)− ε,
U2(x, y) ≥ U2(x, y˜)− ε.
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Algorithm 1 Approximate NE computation via calibration algorithm A
Input: calibration algorithm A along with Wε on the outcome space {0, 1}d ×
{0, 1}d; two player game U1, U2 over ∆d ×∆d.
Initialize Set δ = ε1/3 and p1 to be A(∅)
for t = 1, 2, ..., T do
Let [pt]1 and [pt]2 denote the marginal distributions of pt with respect to the first
and second coordinates (respectively).
Sample the outcomeXt ∈ {0, 1}d×{0, 1}d according to the product distribution:
Xt ∼ BR1,δ([pt]2)×BR2,δ([pt]1)
where BRi,δ is a smooth best-response function, defined in Section 4.1.
Update pt+1 ← A(X1, ..., Xt)
end for
Sample t uniformly from {1, . . . T }
Sample p ∈ V (pt) under the law Pr(p|pt) = ωp(pt).
return BRδ(p) = (BR1,δ([p]2),BR2,δ([p]1))
As we are concerned with an additive notion of approximation, we assume that the
entries of the matrices are in the range [0, 1]. In particular this implies that the functions
U1, U2 are 1-Lipschitz w.r.t the ℓ1 norm, since for all p1, p2, q ∈ ∆d:
Ui(p1, q)− Ui(p2, q) = (p1 − p2)
⊤Uiq ≤ ‖p1 − p2‖‖Uiq‖∞ ≤ ‖p1 − p2‖ (3)
Where we used Ho¨lder’s inequality and the fact that Ui(i, j) ∈ [0, 1].
The following theorem was provided by [CDT09]:
Theorem 2. [CDT09] If there exists a randomized algorithm that computes a ε-NE in
a two player game in time poly(d, 1ε ) then PPAD ⊆ RP .
3.2 Nash equilibria computation with a calibration algorithm
We now present the reduction from weak calibration to computing equilibria in
games, thereby obtaining the hardness result stated in Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 utilizes
a calibration algorithm in a specially tailored game theoretic protocol. Observe this
protocol is run with an outcome space of size d2. This protocol is based on the ideas in
[KF08], which utilized a weak calibration algorithm to obtain asymptotic convergence
to the convex hull of Nash equilibria (also see [MSA07]). Here, our algorithm outputs
a particular approximate Nash equilibrium in finite time, which allows us to provide a
computational complexity lower bound.
Theorem 3. Suppose a weak calibration algorithm A satisfies the following uniform
bound on the calibration rate: CT (X1:T ,A,Wε) ≤ F (d,Wε, T ) (where F does not
depend on X1:T ). Let d > 2 and ε < 1d3 . Then with probability greater than 1/2,
Algorithm 1 (using δ = ε1/3) returns a (4F (d2,Wε, T )+ 22dε1/3)-Nash equilibrium.
This directly implies Corollary 1 as follows:
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Corollary 1. Let A be a weak calibration algorithm that attains a calibration rate of
εc at precision ε. Then for some T (where T is polynomial in ε, d) we have that
CT (X1:T ,A,Wε) ≤ F (d2,Wε, T ) ≤ εc. Theorem 3 implies that Algorithm 1 returns
a O(εc + dε1/3)-NE after T iterations with probability greater than 12 . This consti-
tutes a randomized polynomial time algorithm for ε-NE, which by Theorem 2 implies
PPAD ⊆ RP .
4 Analysis
Our analysis is arranged into three parts. First, we define a smooth best response func-
tion BRδ along with some technical lemmas. Then we show how fixed points of this
BRδ function are approximate Nash equilbria. With these lemmas, we complete the
proof.
4.1 Smooth Best Response Functions
Our algorithm utilizes smooth best response functions. For a mixed strategy q ∈ ∆d,
define the best response functions as:
BRi(q) = argmaxp∈∆d{Ui(p, q)}
In case the RHS is a set, define BRi as an arbitrary member of the set.
We say that a function g : ∆d 7→ ∆d is an ε-best response with respect to Ui if the
following holds:
∀q , Ui(g(q), q) ≥ Ui(BRi(q), q)− ε
It is be convenient to extend the best response function beyond the simplex. Define
for any point in Euclidean space:
∀p ∈ Rn . BRi(p) = BRi(
∏
∆d
(p))
where
∏
K(p) denotes the projection operation onto a convex set K defined as:∏
K
(p) = argmin
q∈K
‖p− q‖2
Using the generalized definition of BRi, define the δ-smooth best response function
as:
BRi,δ(q) := E
‖q′−q‖∞≤δ
[BRi(q
′)] (4)
where the expectation is with respect to the random q′ sampled uniformly on the set
{q′| ‖q′ − q‖∞ ≤ δ}.
Lemma 4. The function BRi,δ is a (2dδ)-best response with respect to Ui.
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Proof. Let q, q′ be such that ‖q − q′‖∞ ≤ δ. Hence, ‖q′ − q‖ ≤ dδ and since Ui is
1-Lipschitz with respect to the ℓ1 norm (see equation (3)):
∀p . |Ui(p, q
′)− Ui(p, q)| ≤ ‖q
′ − q‖ ≤ dδ
Let q′ = argminq˜∈∆d,‖q˜−q‖∞≤δUi(BRi(q˜), q). Using the definitions above, we have
Ui(BRi,δ(q), q) = Ui
(
E
‖q′−q‖∞≤δ
[BRi(q˜)], q
)
≥ Ui(BRi(q
′), q)
≥ Ui(BRi(q
′), q′)− dδ since ‖q′ − q‖∞ ≤ δ
≥ Ui(BRi(q), q
′)− dδ definition of BRi
≥ Ui(BRi(q), q)− 2dδ since ‖q′ − q‖∞ ≤ δ
which completes the proof.
Lemma 5. For 2 < d < 1δ , the function BRi,δ is 2δ2 -Lipschitz.
Proof. Consider any two distributions p, q. We consider two cases:
case 1: ‖p− q‖∞ > δ2 . In this case we have
‖BRi,δ(p)−BRi,δ(q)‖ ≤ ‖BRi,δ(p)‖+ ‖BRi,δ(q)‖ triangle inequality
≤ 2 the range of BRi,δ is ∆d
≤ ‖p− q‖∞ ·
2
δ2
by condition on ‖p− q‖∞
≤ ‖p− q‖ ·
2
δ2
case 2: ‖p− q‖∞ ≤ δ2 . Denote the d-dimensional cube with radius δ centered at p
by
Cdδ (p) = Cδ(p) = {q ∈ ∆d , ‖q − p‖∞ ≤ δ}
We have
‖BRi,δ(p)−BRi,δ(q)‖ = ‖ E
‖p′−p‖∞≤δ
[BRi(p
′)]− E
‖q′−q‖∞≤δ
[BRi(q
′)]‖
= ‖ E
p′∈Cδ(p)
[BRi(p
′)]− E
q′∈Cδ(q)
[BRi(q
′)]‖
≤
vol(Cδ(p) \ Cδ(q) ∪ Cδ(q) \ Cδ(p))
vol(Cδ(p) ∪ Cδ(q))
≤ 2
vol{Cδ(p) \ Cδ(q))
vol(Cδ(q))
The volume of Cδ(x) for any x ∈ Rd is given by δd. To bound the volume of Cδ(p) \
Cδ(q) notice that at least one coordinate of any point in this set is within distance δ of
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p but not of q. Hence, the range of possible values for this coordinate is bounded by
‖p− q‖∞. This is possible for all d coordinates, and we obtain:
vol{Cδ(p) \ Cδ(q)) ≤ ‖p− q‖∞ · d · vol(Cd−1δ (p)) ≤ d‖p− q‖∞δ
d−1
We conclude that:
‖BRi,δ(p)−BRi,δ(q)‖ ≤ 2
vol{Cδ(p) \ Cδ(q))
vol(Cδ(q))
≤
2‖p− q‖∞dδd−1
δd
≤
2d
δ
· ‖p− q‖∞ ≤
2
δ2
‖p− q‖∞
which completes the proof.
4.2 Approximate Nash equilibria and fixed points
Lemma 6. (Approximate NE are Approximate Fixed Points) Let p be a (possibly joint)
distribution on the space of outcomes {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d; let [p]1 and [p]2 denote the
marginal distributions of p with respect to the first and second coordinates (respec-
tively); let BRδ(p) denote the product distribution BR1,δ([p]2) ×BR2,δ([p]1). Sup-
pose
‖p−BRδ(p)‖ ≤ γ
Then BRδ(p) is a (2γ + 2dδ)-NE.
Proof. By construction, BRδ(p) is a product distribution. Hence, it suffices to show
that BR1,δ([p]2) is an (2γ+2dδ)-best response to BR2,δ([p]1) (and vice versa). First,
observe that:
‖[q]1− [p]1‖ =
d∑
i=1
‖
d∑
j=1
(q(i, j)−p(i, j))‖ ≤
d∑
i,j=1
‖q(i, j)−p(i, j)‖ = ‖q−p‖ (5)
Similarly, ‖[q]2 − [p]2‖ ≤ ‖q − p‖ Hence,
‖[p]i −BRi,δ(p)‖ ≤ ‖p−BRδ(p)‖ ≤ γ
By Lemma 4, BR1,δ([p]2) is a 2dδ-best response to [p]2. Since ‖[p]2−BR2,δ([p]1)‖ ≤
γ, we have that for all q ∈ ∆d,
|U1(q, [p]2)− U1(q,BR2,δ([p]1))| ≤ γ
Hence, for all q ∈ ∆d,
U1(BR1,δ([p]2),BR2,δ([p]1)) ≥ U1(BR1,δ([p]2), [p]2)− γ
≥ U1(q, [p]2)− γ − 2dδ
≥ U1(q,BR2,δ([p]1))− 2γ − 2dδ
which proves the claim.
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5 Proof (of Theorem 3))
Three observations are helpful for intuition in the proof:
• By construction in Algorithm 1, in expectation, the outcomesXt are just BRδ(pt).
Precisely, E[Xt|X1, . . . Xt−1] = BRδ(pt).
• Suppose ωp(pt) is nonzero (so ‖p− pt‖ ≤ ε ). Then, by Lemma 5, the larger δ
is the closer BRδ(pt) and BRδ(p) will be to each other.
• The smaller δ is, the more accurate an approximate NE we have for an approxi-
mate fixed point of BRδ (by Lemma 6).
The proof of Theorem 3 is a consequence from the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let p and X1:T be the random variables defined in Algorithm 1. For 2 <
d < 1δ , we have that:
E ‖p−BRδ(p)‖ ≤ E[CT (X1:T ,A,W
ε)] + ε+
4ε
δ2
The proof of our Main result now follows:
Theorem 3. By Markov’s inequality, we have that with probability greater than 1/2
‖p−BRδ(p)‖ ≤ 2E[CT (X1:T ,A,W
ε)] + 2ε+
8ε
δ2
≤ 2F (d2,Wε, T ) + 10ε1/3
using the definition of F (on a d2 sized outcome space) and δ = ε1/3. By applying
Lemma 6, we have a (4F (d2,Wε, T ) + 20ε1/3 + 2dε1/3)-NE, which completes the
proof.
We continue to prove Lemma 7:
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Lemma 7. We proceed by lower bounding the expected calibration rate as follows:
E[CT (X1:T ,A,W
ε)]
= E

∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ωp(pt)(pt −Xt)
∥∥∥∥∥


≥
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥E
[
T∑
t=1
ωp(pt)(pt −Xt)
]∥∥∥∥∥ Jensen’s
=
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(pt −Xt)]
∥∥∥∥∥ linearity
=
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ E[ωp(pt)(pt −Xt)|X1, . . . Xt−1] ]
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(pt −BRδ(pt))]
∥∥∥∥∥ pt is determined by the history
Note that by construction in Algorithm 1 E[Xt|X1, . . .Xt−1] = BRδ(pt), which we
have used in the last step.
Hence, we have:
E[CT (X1:T ,A,W
ε)] ≥
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(p−BRδ(p))]
∥∥∥∥∥
−
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(p− pt +BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p))]
∥∥∥∥∥
by the triangle inequality.
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For the first term,
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(p−BRδ(p))]
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
(
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)]
)
(p−BRδ(p))
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)] ‖p−BRδ(p)‖
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
E

∑
p∈V
ωp(pt) ‖p−BRδ(p)‖


:= E
p∼D
‖p−BRδ(p)‖
where p ∼ D is sampled as follows: first, sample t uniformly from [T ], then sample
pt according to the underlying process, and then sample p ∈ V (pt) with probability
ωp(pt). Note that D is precisely the sampling procedure defined in Algorithm 1.
For the last term, we have that:
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(p− pt +BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p))]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
‖E [ωp(pt)(p− pt +BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p))]‖ triangle inequality
≤
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
E [‖ωp(pt)(p− pt +BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p))‖] Jensen’s
≤
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt) ‖p− pt‖+ ωp(pt) ‖BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p)‖] sublinearity
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Now observe that for product distributions D = p(x)q(y) and D′ = p′(x)q′(y).
‖D −D′‖ =
∑
x,y
|p(x)q(y) − p′(x)q′(y)|
≤
∑
x,y
|p(x)q(y) − p(x)q′(y)|+
∑
x,y
|p(x)q′(y)− p′(x)q′(y)|
=
∑
x,y
p(x)|q(y) − q′(y)|+
∑
x,y
q′(y)|p(x)− p′(x)|
= ‖q − q′‖+ ‖p− p′‖
Also note that V (q) has diameter ε, then if wp(q) 6= 0 then ‖p− q‖ ≤ ε. Hence,
‖BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p)‖
≤ ‖BR1,δ([pt]2)−BR1,δ([p]2)‖ + ‖BR2,δ([pt]1)−BR2,δ([p]1)‖
≤
2 ‖[pt]2 − [p]2‖
δ2
+
2 ‖[pt]1 − [p]1‖
δ2
by Lemma 5
≤
4 ‖pt − p‖
δ2
by Equation 5
≤
4ε
δ2
where we have used Lemma 5 with our condition on d.
Hence, for the last term,
1
T
∑
p∈V
∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)(p− pt +BRδ(pt)−BRδ(p))]
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
1
T
∑
p∈V
T∑
t=1
E [ωp(pt)]
(
ε+
4ε
δ2
)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
E

∑
p∈V
ωp(pt)

(ε+ 4ε
δ2
)
=ε+
4ε
δ2
The claim now follows.
6 Discussion and Open Problems
This work provides a computational lower bound for weak calibration, suggesting that
the hardness of the problem may be fundamentally related to the problem of finding a
fixed point. The following questions remain open:
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• Is it possible to obtain an efficient algorithm for strong calibration? (One which
gives a low calibration error in time polynomial in the relevant parameters.)
• What is the statistical complexity of (weak or strong) calibration? Here, the sta-
tistical complexity is the number of rounds required to calibrate at some desired
level of accuracy, without computational considerations.
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